Available here: https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-03263-0_5
Developing Countries: Whether Legal (and Costly) Settlement of Disputes Is Better Than Political Settlement
Renata Vargas Amaral (1) Email author (email@example.com) Welber Barral (1)
The rule-oriented dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is a remarkable achievement in international economic regulations in which law has a major role. Trade law, among all international legal systems, is the most advanced and used one. Bearing this in mind, this article approaches the main users of the system over the years—with a significant increase in developing countries’ participation—the advantages of using the system for all WTO Members (and whether the system works for developing economies), and how changes in the dispute settlement system’s rules could facilitate small and developing countries’ ability to pursue legal claims. This chapter is aimed at showing that even with the difficulties imposed by the system itself for developing economies’ participation, it normally provides for a safer and long-lasting solution than a purely political settlement.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access.
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019
About this chapter
Cite this chapter as:
Amaral R.V., Barral W. (2019) Developing Countries: Whether Legal (and Costly) Settlement of Disputes Is Better Than Political Settlement. In: do Amaral Júnior A., de Oliveira Sá Pires L., Lucena Carneiro C. (eds) The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03263-0_5
First Online 26 November 2018
Publisher Name Springer, Cham
Print ISBN 978-3-030-03262-3
Online ISBN 978-3-030-03263-0
eBook Packages Law and Criminology Law and Criminology (R0)
Buy this book on publisher’s site
Reprints and Permissions
© 2020 Springer Nature Switzerland AG. Part of Springer Nature.
Not logged in LYRASIS (3000176756) – American University (8200705427) 126.96.36.199